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Abstract 
The Bilateral Agreements concluded between Switzerland and the European 
Union rely on the parallel wording of part of their provisions to EU norms 
and references to EU secondary legislation to achieve a parallel legal situa-
tion between the EU and Switzerland. As the present contribution shows, 
this transfer of notions and concepts of EU law also encompasses EU fun-
damental rights standards, which possess thus binding effect for Switzerland 
under certain circumstances, although they are not explicitly mentioned in 
the agreements. As a result, fundamental rights protection in Switzerland has 
gained an additional source of protection and increased its effectiveness, 
which comes, however, at the price of rising complexity. 
1. Introduction 
The relationship between the EU and Switzerland is determined nowadays 
by the so-called ‘Bilateral Agreements’. Having rejected by a clear majority 
of the Swiss cantons and a narrow majority of the Swiss people accession to 
the European Economic Area on December 6
th
 1992, Switzerland opted to 
follow what is often referred to as the ‘bilateral path’  to foster economic 
relations to the EU internal market. Switzerland’s strategy essentially con-
sists thus of the conclusion of sectoral agreements with the EU, but also of a 
simultaneous unilateral effort of adapting Swiss law autonomously to the 
                                                 
1
 The present contribution is partly based on an earlier book contribution, see Epiney 
(2013), pp.141 ff. 
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ever changing requirements of EU law, in particular but not limited to areas 
covered by the EU internal market.
2
 
Two ‘packages’ of Bilateral Agreements between the EU and Switzerland 
can be distinguished. The first package was signed in June 1999 and entered 
into force collectively in 2002. These agreements covered the topics of free 
movement of persons, research, technical barriers to trade, agricultural prod-
ucts, land transport, air transport and public procurement.
3
 The second pack-
age of agreements was signed in 2004 and entered into force separately dur-
ing the subsequent years. These agreements covered the topics of the taxa-
tion of pensions received by former EU officials resident in Switzerland, 
processed agricultural goods, the participation of Switzerland in the Europe-
an Environmental Agency, statistics, the participation of Switzerland in var-
ious programs concerning education, professional training and youth, 
‘Schengen’ and ‘Dublin’, the taxation of savings income and the combat 
against fraud.
4
 
The various agreements exhibit different structures and objectives and 
have thus typically been allocated categories: ‘Cooperation agreements’ 
provide for the participation of Switzerland in EU-programs, while ‘liberali-
sation and harmonisation agreements’ such as the Free Movement of Persons 
Agreement achieve partial access to the EU internal market; ‘partial integra-
tion agreements’ establish a very close cooperation in particular sectors, typ-
ically with an even somewhat integrated institutional framework between 
Switzerland and the EU.
5
 The present contribution does not purport to exam-
ine the content of the Bilateral Agreements in further detail;
6
 instead, it fo-
cuses on the absence of provisions on fundamental rights in the agreements 
and the questions raised by this absence. This absence is all the more rele-
vant in the light of the topics covered by the agreements, some of which are 
highly likely to raise fundamental rights concerns such as the free movement 
of persons or Schengen and Dublin.  
                                                 
2
 See on the promises and pitfalls of this strategy of ‘autonomous implementation’ Maiani 
(2013), pp. 29 ff. 
3
 See for the full text in English respectively OJ 2002 L 114, 6 ff.; OJ 2002 L 114, 468 ff.; 
OJ 2002 L 114, 369 ff.; OJ 2002 L 114, 132 ff.; OJ 2002 L 114, 91 ff.; OJ 2002 L 114, 73 
ff.; OJ 2002 L 114, 430 ff. 
4
 See again respectively Agreement of 26 October 2004, not published in the Official Jour-
nal; OJ 2005 L 23, 19 ff.; OJ 2006 L 90, 36 ff.; OJ 2007 L 303, 11 ff.; OJ 2008 L 53, 50 ff.; 
OJ 2008 L 53, 5 ff.; OJ 2004 L 385, 30 ff.; OJ 2009 L 46, 8 ff.  
5
 See for this categorisation Felder (2006), pp. 101 f. 
6
 See for a recent overview of the Bilateral Agreements and their integration mechanisms 
Pirker and Epiney (2013 (forthcoming)). See also for an instructive overview on the current 
state of relations between the EU and Switzerland the Report of the European Parliament 
(2010) Internal Market beyond the EU: EEA and Switzerland.  
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At a first look, the transfer of parts of the EU legal acquis seems thus to 
exclude the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
on fundamental rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights which 
codifies to a considerable extent this case law.
7
 Consequently, this case law 
could be considered irrelevant in the application of the Bilateral Agreements 
in Switzerland. However, such a conclusion proves deceptive upon a closer 
look: EU fundamental rights are to be respected throughout the interpreta-
tion and application of all EU law, which could also have an impact on the 
interpretation and application of the Bilateral Agreements. This claim is ex-
amined in the present contribution, detailing first the manner of ‘transfer’ of 
parts of the EU legal acquis into the agreements and the relevance of the 
CJEU’s case law for their interpretation (2.). The scope of the binding effect 
of EU fundamental rights is subsequently assessed (3.), to conclude lastly 
with some observations on the consequences of the thesis put forward in this 
paper (4.). 
2. Mechanisms of ‘transfer’ of the EU legal acquis in the 
Bilateral Agreements 
To fully understand the potential relevance of EU fundamental rights in the 
application of the Bilateral Agreements in Switzerland, we must first turn to 
the mechanisms of transfer that the agreements establish for the parts of the 
EU legal acquis which they cover. In a second step, we then assess to what 
extent the interpretation given to EU law by the CJEU is also pertinent to 
interpret the ‘transferred’ or parallel norms contained in the Bilateral 
Agreements.  
2.1. Transfer mechanisms in the Bilateral Agreements 
A large number of the Bilateral Agreements are based in different ways, but 
to a substantial degree on the EU legal acquis.
8
 The object and material 
scope of each agreement determines the degree of transfer: some agreements 
aim for integration of Switzerland into parts of EU law more than others and 
require thus a more far-reaching adaptation to the existing EU legal acquis.  
                                                 
7
 See generally on the Charter and on EU fundamental rights law and case law Iglesias 
Sanchez (2012); De Búrca (2011); Bryde (2010), passim. 
8
 See for a detailed examination of the various mechanisms of transfer Epiney et al (2012), 
pp. 140 ff. 
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Technically, the transfer of EU law is implemented in the respective 
agreement either through a direct reference to EU legal acts such as second-
ary legislation
9
 or through the use of provisions which replicate or at least 
resemble in their wording EU legal provisions.
10
 Since the agreements are 
treaties under international law, in principle the obligations they contain are 
formally of a static nature: in particular, changes in EU law to which they 
refer or which they replicate do not ‘automatically’ modify the content of a 
treaty. However, since the objective of the agreements is to secure a legal 
situation in Switzerland as parallel as possible to the one in the EU, specific 
provisions in the agreements provide for an integration of new EU legisla-
tive developments into the agreements. Three mechanisms can be distin-
guished for this purpose. 
First, the Joint Committees formed by representatives of the contracting 
parties are often attributed the competence to modify annexes to agreements 
to e.g. adapt the list of EU secondary legislation accordingly. Typically, the 
Bilateral Agreements I contain this mechanism, as the example of the 
Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons shows. As Joint Committees 
decide by unanimity, such adaptations may also fail to take place, leaving 
the acquis under the Bilateral Agreements behind concerning relevant new 
developments in EU law. 
Second, the Schengen and Dublin Association Agreements provide for an 
obligation for Switzerland to continuously adopt new developments in the 
respective field of EU law, but leave it to Switzerland’s ordinary legislative 
procedure to implement the necessary changes. If new developments are not 
adopted, the respective agreement is automatically terminated after a certain 
period of time. There is thus no ‘automatic’ duty to adopt new EU law for 
Switzerland, but if new legal developments are for whatever reason not 
adopted in Switzerland the subsequent termination of the agreement consti-
tutes a very heavy sanction. Switzerland is thus effectively left with little 
leeway.
11
 
A third, somewhat similar mechanism has been found in the more recent 
Agreement on Customs Security:
12
 While initially automatic termination in 
case of non-implementation of new legal acts by Switzerland had been the 
                                                 
9
 See e.g. Annexes II and III of the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons, which list 
relevant secondary legislation and impose an obligation on Switzerland to create ‘equiva-
lent legislation’. 
10
 See e.g. Annex I of the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons which replicates at 
some points word by word EU law. 
11
 The literature often uses the term of the ‘all or nothing’ principle applying for the 
Schengen and Dublin Agreements, see Epiney et al (2005), pp. 38 ff.; Baudenbacher 
(2010), p. 258. 
12
 OJ 2009 L 199, 24 ff. 
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objective for the EU,
13
 the eventual compromise provides for the possibility 
for the EU to take compensatory measures if Switzerland does not imple-
ment new legal acts. The Joint Committee can then turn to an arbitral tribu-
nal to examine the proportionality of such compensatory measures. 
It should be noted that for the future, the EU insists on finding a solution 
which ensures a continuous and dynamic integration of Switzerland into the 
developing EU legal acquis. The Schengen/Dublin model is thus likely to 
represent the ‘minimum standard’ for future bilateral cooperation, while the 
Agreement on Customs Security constitutes rather a ‘special case’ than a 
true model for other, less specific agreements.
14
 While the Swiss government 
is hoping to be able to continue with bilateral, sector-specific solutions,
15
 the 
EU position is more sceptical and demands that before the conclusion of any 
new agreements an adequate institutional framework has to be found; ac-
cording to the Council of the EU, such a framework must ensure a dynamic 
adaptation to the EU legal acquis and international mechanisms of surveil-
lance and judicial interpretation of the Bilateral acquis.
16
 
2.2. The relevance of the interpretations given to EU law by the CJEU 
The partial integration of Switzerland into the EU legal acquis through the 
Bilateral Agreements raises the question if and to what extent parallel norms 
of the Bilateral acquis ought to be interpreted in the same way as the parallel 
norms of EU law.
17
 The answer to this question simultaneously lays the 
groundwork for the main issue of this paper, i.e. whether the interpretation 
of the Bilateral Agreements requires taking into account EU fundamental 
rights as used by the CJEU when interpreting the parallel EU legal acquis.  
The argument in favour of such ‘parallel’ interpretation is  particularly 
strong where the regulatory objective of an agreement is to achieve a parallel 
legal situation in the EU and in Switzerland. For this purpose, alignment 
with the jurisprudence of the CJEU appears indispensable. Some agreements 
expressly provide for the consideration of such case law. In the Agreement 
on the Free Movement of Persons, Article 16 paragraph 2 provides that 
‘[i]nsofar as’ concepts of EU law are concerned, ‘account shall be taken of 
the relevant case-law of the Court of Justice’ prior to the date of signature of 
                                                 
13
 Baumgartner et al (2009/20120), pp. 420 ff. 
14
 See on this point Neue Zürcher Zeitung (7.7.2010). 
15
 See also on other options discussed in Switzerland Thürer (2012), p. 483. 
16
 Council Conclusions on EU relations with EFTA countries of 20 December 2012, pt. 33. 
See on this topic Epiney (2013), pp. 59 ff. 
17
 See on this topic Epiney and Zbinden (2009), pp. 7 ff.; Klein (2006), pp. 1 ff.; Bieber 
(2011), pp. 1 ff. 
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the agreement. But also in the case of the Schengen and Dublin agreements, 
the wording and objective of the respective agreement provide strong argu-
ments in favour of a ‘parallel’ interpretation in line with the CJEU’s hold-
ings.
18
 Indeed, when interpreting the Agreement on the Free Movement of 
Persons, the Swiss Supreme Court routinely refers to the CJEU’s case law as 
a relevant source of inspiration.
19
 
Of course, the temporary scope of inspiration by the CJEU’s jurispru-
dence also requires clarification. The mentioned Article 16 paragraph 2 of 
the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons refers only to case law 
handed down ‘prior to the date of its signature’. Taking a formalist ap-
proach, one could thus consider later case law to be irrelevant. However, in 
practice the Swiss Supreme Court takes a pragmatic approach and routinely 
takes into account also later case law to fulfil the objective of creating a con-
tinuous parallel legal situation.
20
 Similarly, the CJEU has referred in the few 
cases on the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons to its own earlier 
as well as later case law while interpreting the Agreement’s provisions.21 
This pragmatic approach seems also well founded based on the objectives 
pursued by individual Bilateral Agreements as well as the overall framework 
they have established.
22
 
While there is thus a good argument in favour of taking into account EU 
case law generally in the interpretation of the Bilateral Agreements, a num-
ber of questions remain to be answered in each concrete case. First, it is not 
always obvious whether notions in the Bilateral Agreements are effectively 
taken from EU law. Furthermore, the relevance of new developments in EU 
law for the interpretation and application of a provision in a Bilateral 
Agreement is not always obvious, in particular as regards new case law of 
the CJEU. Contentious questions may eventually only be resolved at the lev-
el of the highest courts, with the consequent lack of legal certainty and the 
additional problem that there may be a simple continuous divergence of 
opinions between the EU and Switzerland because of the lack of a binding 
mechanism for dispute settlement between both contracting parties.
23
 
Despite these difficulties, we can retain that the need to take into account 
EU case law in the interpretation of the Bilateral Agreements provides in 
                                                 
18
 Epiney et al (2012), pp. 175 ff. See also with similar results on the Agreement on the 
Free Movement of Persons Oesch (2011), pp. 583 ff.; Maiani (2011), pp. 27 ff.; Burri and 
Pirker (2010), pp. 165 ff.; Baudenbacher (2012); pp. 574 ff. 
19
 See e.g. the overview over the case law on the Agreement on the Free Movement of Per-
sons Epiney and Metz (2011/2012), pp. 223 ff. 
20
 The landmark case to be mentioned at this point is BGE 136 II 5. 
21
 See e.g. CJEU, Case C-16/09 Schwemmer, ECR [2010] I-09717, para 32 f.  
22
 Epiney et al (2012), pp. 169 ff. 
23
 Epiney (2011/2012), pp. 81 ff. 
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principle a basis for the thesis of this paper that the interpretation of the Bi-
lateral Agreements requires taking into account EU fundamental rights as 
used by the CJEU when interpreting the parallel EU legal acquis. 
3. The relevance of EU fundamental rights in the interpre-
tation and application of the Bilateral Agreements 
To assess to what extent we can speak of a binding effect of EU fundamental 
rights in the sphere of application of the Bilateral Agreements, we must now 
as a further step first examine the dogmatic problem of the transfer of EU 
fundamental rights itself. Then, we turn to an assessment of the scope of the 
effect of these rights within EU law, to be able to eventually judge to what 
extent we can actually support such a binding effect for the application of 
the Bilateral Agreements. 
3.1. Defining the problem 
The case law on the Bilateral Agreements has yet to address the question as 
to whether the jurisprudence of the CJEU on fundamental rights is relevant 
for the interpretation of said agreements. Dogmatically speaking, we must 
ask whether the ‘transfer’ of EU law through the Bilateral Agreements en-
compasses at least in some cases also the EU fundamental rights acquis or, 
put differently, whether the ‘concepts’ of EU law mentioned in provisions 
like Article 16 paragraph 2 of the Agreement on the Free Movement of Per-
sons also include EU fundamental rights standards. 
The question concerns thus the reach of the transfer of the EU legal ac-
quis under the Bilateral Agreements, which is of particular importance be-
cause of the CJEU’s supreme authority to interpret EU law. Even if the 
Court is basing its case law on concepts that have not been transposed to the 
Bilateral Agreements as such, arguably such case law or at least certain parts 
of it may be relevant to construe provisions of an agreement: ‘parallel’ rights 
could be at issue.  
This point as well as the difficulty of distinguishing relevant from irrele-
vant parts of the CJEU’s case law can perhaps best be demonstrated with the 
example of Union citizenship as a concept of EU law. While Union citizen-
ship has not been transposed to the Bilateral Agreements, a number of rights 
of free movement contained in the Agreement on the Free Movement of Per-
sons are equivalent to and effectively mirror rights held by Union citizens. 
As soon as the CJEU construes these citizenship-based rights, such jurispru-
dence ought to be considered relevant just as well for the ‘parallel’ rights 
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contained in the Agreement. As an example, the finding of the CJEU that a 
parent of a minor Union citizen entitled to custody can derive a right of res i-
dence
24
 was also found pertinent and relevant by the Swiss Supreme Court 
for a case on the right to free movement of non-workers.
25
 
Consequently, as a crucial problem it is only possible to establish which 
aspects of EU law and the CJEU’s case law are relevant in the framework of 
a case-by-case analysis. Even where at first look no EU law notions or con-
cepts seem to have been transferred to a Bilateral Agreement, only interpre-
tation can tell with certainty for the case at hand whether, notwithstanding 
this preliminary conclusion, certain aspects of EU case law may prove effec-
tively relevant. 
As a consequence, the relevance of EU fundamental rights cannot simply 
be denied based on the fact that such rights are not explicitly mentioned in 
the Bilateral Agreements. There may very well be situations where interpre-
tation of the Bilateral Agreements will require recourse to EU legal princi-
ples including EU fundamental rights. However, such recourse requires a 
finding that these concrete principles of EU law interpreted by the CJEU 
have actually been transferred into the Bilateral Agreement at issue.  
By contrast to the mentioned case of Union citizenship, for EU funda-
mental rights there does not exist a set of rights in the Bilateral Agreements 
which would be similar to those granted by citizenship but simply based on a 
different heading such as ‘free movement’ instead of ‘citizenship’. The 
question therefore is not about fundamental rights having been transferred 
verbatim to the Bilateral Agreements, but rather whether they have become 
part of the Agreements as an implicit and inextricable part of the treaty obli-
gations, i.e. of the EU legal notions contained in the Agreements. While an 
answer to this question can only be found on a case-by-case basis by exam-
ining each Bilateral Agreement’s provisions and notions, the approach of 
and reason for the potential binding effect of EU fundamental rights is al-
ways the same: EU fundamental rights become part of the respective agree-
ment and therefore binding upon Switzerland in the application of said 
agreement because they form part of the notions of EU law transferred to the 
agreement which – for the above-mentioned reasons – have to be interpreted 
taking into account EU law and the latter’s interpretation by the CJEU.  
                                                 
24
 CJEU, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen, ECR [2004] I-9925. 
25
 2 C_574/2010, Judgment of 15 November 2010; see also BVGer, C-8146/2010, Judg-
ment of 18 April 2011. See already earlier on the topic Epiney et al (2004/2005), pp. 42 ff. 
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3.2. The binding effect of EU fundamental rights for EU Member States 
The extent of the binding effect of EU fundamental rights for EU Member 
States is a complex and disputed subject which cannot be addressed in full 
for the sake of the present contribution. It ought to suffice to base our find-
ings on the current legal situation as mostly defined by the CJEU’s case law. 
EU fundamental rights apply in principle to the institutions and organs of the 
EU, but also to Member States when they apply or implement EU law. The 
codification of fundamental rights through the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights has also included Article 51 paragraph 1 which states that these rights 
apply ‘to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law’. 
There are various readings as to whether this clause has actually restricted 
the scope of application of EU fundamental rights under the Charter or simp-
ly confirmed the pre-existing practice.
26
 
Despite the controversy on details, generally three constellations can be 
distinguished in which Member States can be bound by EU fundamental 
rights standards. First, they are bound in ‘agency situations’,27 where they 
are directly applying or implementing EU law. This is often also referred to 
as the ‘Wachauf’ situation based on the pertinent jurisprudence by the 
CJEU.
28
 A typical situation is the transposition of provisions of a directive, 
which has to comply with EU fundamental rights standards.
29
 The question 
remaining is, however, to what degree Member State action must be deter-
mined by the requirements of EU law to speak of implementation.
30
 
Second, EU fundamental rights must be respected when Member States 
deviate from the fundamental freedoms of the EU internal market. Based on 
the respective case law, this is often termed an ‘ERT’ situation.31 A pertinent 
example is the expulsion of EU citizens based on public order or security 
reasons, which requires respect of EU fundamental rights in particular as 
regards the right to family life. Some of the literature has offered criticism of 
the Court’s holdings,32 but the case law continues to require such respect.33 
                                                 
26
 See in favour of a less restrictive reading of Article 51 e.g. Lenaerts (2012), p. 17; read-
ing Article 51 as a mere declaratory clause Borowsky (2011), p. 633 n. 11; in favour of a 
restrictive interpretation Jacobs (2010), p. 137 f. 
27
 See on the notion of agency Kingreen (2011), p. 2959 n. 8 ff. 
28
 CJEU, Case 5/88 Wachauf, ECR [1989] 2609. 
29
 See e.g. CJEU, Case C-540/03 Commission v. Council, ECR [2006] I-5769. 
30
 See e.g. Nusser (2011), p. 130. 
31
 CJEU, Case C-260/89 ERT, ECR [1991] I-2925. 
32
 Jacobs (2010), pp. 137 f. criticizes the needless overwriting of domestic standards of 
fundamental rights protection; others argue that Union law permits derogation by Member 
States it cannot be impeded, even as far as its fundamental rights standards are concerned, 
see Kingreen (2011), p. 2961 n. 14f.; the possibility of derogation should for some also 
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Third, recent case law has added that Member States also have to respect 
EU fundamental rights where EU secondary law provides for various options 
of implementation without requiring specific action.
34
 In the case at issue, 
the CJEU had to answer several questions on the applicability of EU funda-
mental rights and the admissibility of refoulement of asylum seekers to 
Greece under EU asylum law, in particular Regulation 343/2003.
35
 Central-
ly, the Court decided that if a Member State took the decision to examine a 
request for asylum itself under Article 3 of the Regulation, although based 
on the ‘Dublin’ criteria another Member State would be competent, this 
would constitute an act of implementation of EU law. Despite the fact that 
the Member State had thus discretion in exercising this right to examine a 
request itself, the Charter of Fundamental Rights would apply. This some-
what mirrors the situation where Member States have the option of deviating 
from fundamental freedoms under EU internal market law, but still have to 
respect EU fundamental rights when doing so according to the Court.  
This development is particularly important as the applicability of EU fundamental rights 
also means that the CJEU is the competent ultimate authority to construe these rights and 
verify compliance with them.
36
 Applying these findings to the case at hand, the CJEU sub-
sequently found that it was contrary to EU law to establish an irrefutable presumption  in 
one Member State that EU fundamental rights would be respected in another Member State 
and that refoulement under the Dublin system would thus always be admissible without 
taking into account at all the possibility of systematic failure of the asylum procedure in 
that Member State with severe consequences for the asylum seekers’ right not to suffer 
inhumane or degrading treatment in the sense of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. 
Summing up, it is thus the question of when Member States are imple-
menting EU law that will require further clarification in the future. Bold 
proposals would ask the reach of EU fundamental rights to be essentially 
based on the existence of EU competences.
37
 Some more cautious proposals 
                                                 
include the freedom to choose domestic fundamental rights protection standards, Borowsky 
(2011), p. 655 n. 29. 
33
 See e.g. CJEU, Case C-368/95 Familiapress, ECR [1997] I-3689; Case C-112/00 
Schmidberger, ECR [2003] I-5659; Case C-438/05 Viking, ECR [2007] I-10779. 
34
 CJEU, Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S., not yet published. 
35
 OJ 2003 L 50, 1. 
36
 Sceptical on a perceived transformation of the CJEU towards a veritable fundamental 
rights court e.g. Bryde (2010), p. 125; Ludwig (2011), p. 733. 
37
 See Conclusions of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano, ECR 
[2011] I-01177. See for a discussion of this proposal von Bogdandy et al (2012), p. 500; 
see more sceptical Streinz and Michl (2012), p. 2864 n. 15. 
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have been proposed in the doctrine.
38
 For the present purposes, it suffices, 
however, to assess the CJEU’s case law. Generally, the Court seems to take 
a continuously expanding view in its recent decisions.
39
 As an example, in 
one of the most recent decisions it found that a system of criminal and ad-
ministrative sanctions established under national law to punish infringe-
ments of value added tax legislation fell within the scope of EU law and 
thereby could be considered an implementation of EU law to which EU fun-
damental rights applied,
40
 although it was only the VAT legislation which 
implemented Directive 2006/112/EC.
41
 These findings can now help to un-
derstand to what extent the binding effect of EU fundamental rights stand-
ards has been transferred to the Bilateral Agreements. 
3.3 The ‘integration’ of EU fundamental rights into the Bilateral Agree-
ments 
As previously discussed, the Bilateral Agreements take over EU law in a 
number of areas. This transfer of law, however, raises the question as to 
whether EU fundamental rights are also encompassed, i.e. whether the rules 
just set out on the binding effect of EU fundamental rights for EU Member 
States are also applicable under the Bilateral Agreements. This would mean 
that the concepts and notions of the Bilateral Agreements that are based on 
EU law also have to be applied and interpreted in accordance with EU fun-
damental rights. Simultaneously, margins of discretion for implementation 
opened by such concepts or notions would also have to be used respecting 
EU fundamental right standards. 
Since EU fundamental rights encompass a very broad range of rights in-
cluding economic and procedural ones, practically all Bilateral Agreements 
could be potentially concerned. The most important agreements in this re-
gard are, however, certainly the Agreement on the Free Movement of Per-
sons and the Schengen/Dublin Association Agreements. As one example, 
with these principles in mind expulsion of an EU citizen based on the 
grounds of public order and security as enshrined in Article 5 of Annex I of 
the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons would only be possible in 
accordance with EU fundamental rights as interpreted by the CJEU. Fur-
                                                 
38
 See e.g. Nusser (2011); others mainly call for cooperation between the various funda-
mental rights courts active in the EU, see e.g. Iglesias Sanchez (2012), pp. 1606 ff. 
39
 See e.g. CJEU, Case C-339/10 Krasimir A. Estov, ECR [2010] I-11465; Case C-457/09 
Chartry, ECR [2011] I-00819. 
40
 CJEU, Case C-617/10 Akerberg Fransson, Judgment of 26 February 2013, paras 20-21. 
41
 OJ 2006 L 347, 1 ff. 
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thermore, Switzerland would also have to consider the fundamental rights 
case law of the CJEU under the Dublin Agreement. This would encompass 
not only case law on the interpretation of the relevant provisions of EU sec-
ondary law, but also on the appropriate use of the margin of discretion doc-
trine which must also comply with EU fundamental rights standards. 
As an argument against the relevance of EU fundamental rights some may 
raise the fact that fundamental rights as such are not part of the Bilateral 
Agreements. Neither do they appear in the text of the Agreements or their 
preambles nor are there parallel provisions which are simply based on dif-
ferent grounds as in the case of free movement rights of Union citizens on 
the one hand and the rights granted to individuals under the Agreement on 
the Free Movement of Persons on the other hand. Additionally, one could 
contend that the Bilateral Agreements as a whole aim for a lower degree of 
integration than e.g. the European Economic Area, which would justify a 
more cautious approach to the parallel interpretation of provisions of the 
agreements to the corresponding norms of EU law.
42
 Taking into account the 
effect of EU fundamental rights on EU Member States, one could argue 
moreover that accepting EU fundamental rights in the legal regime of the 
Bilateral Agreements may lead to a much deeper integration of Switzerland 
into the EU legal acquis than the substance of the Bilateral Agreements 
could possibly justify or than it might have been intended by the conclusion 
of the agreements.  
However, at the end of the day the arguments in favour of a transfer of 
EU fundamental rights standards and the respective case law of the CJEU 
appear more convincing, as long as the precondition is fulfilled that notions 
of EU law are to be applied and interpreted because the Bilateral Agreement 
in question is following EU law in the norm at issue. The Swiss Supreme 
Court has also followed this approach when adjudicating upon the rights 
contained in the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons which are 
fashioned following the model of EU law including the pertinent EU funda-
mental rights standards.
43
 Centrally, the exact scope and content of such 
rights or other notions and concepts is to be determined in EU law itself tak-
ing into account EU fundamental rights; these standards of fundamental 
rights protection are thus necessarily part of the norms of EU law that are 
transferred to the Bilateral Agreements.  
                                                 
42
 See in this sense CJEU, Case C-70/09 Hengartner, ECR [2010] I-7233. See, however, a 
different approach in more recent case law, CJEU, Case C-506/10 Graf, Judgment of 6 
October 2011, not yet published, and C-257/10 Bergström, Judgment of 15 December 
2011, not yet published. 
43
 BGE 130 II 113. 
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If the principle of parallel interpretation of such transferred parts of the 
EU legal acquis is accepted,
44
 there is no convincing reason why an excep-
tion should be made for EU fundamental rights. This point is reinforced by 
the mentioned objectives pursued by the Bilateral Agreements, which aim 
for a parallel legal situation in Switzerland as compared to the EU; this aim 
in particular requires taking into account EU fundamental rights, as other-
wise no parallel legal situation could be ensured. Furthermore, it seems more 
than difficult to try to split the case law of the CJEU on specific legal guar-
antees into components or layers to be able to avoid taking into considera-
tion those components or layers that are based on the application of EU fun-
damental rights. The relevance and impact of EU fundamental rights was, 
moreover, well-known during the negotiation and at the date of signature of 
the Bilateral Agreements, which makes it possible to claim that exceptions 
from the principle of parallel interpretation for EU fundamental rights would 
have had to be laid down more expressly in the text of the agreements. 
Summing up, our analysis thus supports a well-founded argument that 
within the interpretation of notions and concepts in the Bilateral Agreements 
that have been taken from the EU legal acquis EU fundamental rights have 
to be respected in the same manner as under EU law. If we generalize this 
approach, the implicit relevance of principles of EU law can also play a role 
as regards other norms or legal acts of primary or secondary EU law which 
have not been explicitly mentioned in the Bilateral Agreements. As an ex-
ample, it appears conceivable that during the interpretation of the Dublin 
Regulation under the Dublin Association Agreement systematic interpreta-
tion would also refer to other legal acts of EU asylum law even if those acts 
are not part of that Agreement. As a consequence, such legal acts would be 
relevant for Switzerland not via their integration into the Agreement, but as 
part of the interpretation of the Dublin Regulation. 
Having found EU fundamental rights applicable under the Bilateral 
Agreements based on the previous reflections as far as they have been trans-
ferred implicitly to those agreements as part of EU law notions and con-
cepts, one may wonder whether there is also a direct legal basis to apply EU 
fundamental rights under the Bilateral Agreements. There is, however, no 
such basis as a matter of principle, as far as an ‘isolated’ reliance on EU 
fundamental rights is concerned. EU fundamental rights are only binding 
standards as part of the notions and concepts of EU law included in the Bi-
lateral Agreements; they are not granted as self-standing rights as e.g. the 
rights granted under the European Convention on Human Rights. Still, they 
can be relied upon by individuals in the framework of the implementation of 
                                                 
44
 See already section 2.2. 
14                                                         Astrid Epiney/Benedikt Pirker 
 
 
notions of EU law used in the Bilateral Agreements. As a consequence, an 
asylum seeker can e.g. argue that his transfer to a certain EU Member State 
based on the obligations under the Dublin Association Agreement violates 
his right under Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights not to 
suffer torture or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. Similarly, 
an EU-citizen could rely on Article 7 of the Charter on the respect for pri-
vate and family life to contest the legality of his expulsion for reasons of 
public order or security. In the mentioned cases, however, EU fundamental 
rights are not applied directly as self-standing guarantees, but only as a re-
sult of the need to apply and interpret the relevant provisions of the Bilateral 
Agreements in conformity with EU fundamental rights. 
4.  Conclusion 
The approach developed in the present contribution which suggests that EU 
fundamental rights are relevant also in the application and interpretation of 
the Bilateral Agreements is not only of theoretical or dogmatic interest. In 
practice, the fundamental rights at issue are substantially also contained in 
the European Convention on Human Rights and therefore binding for Swit-
zerland. Furthermore, also the CJEU’s case law constantly takes inspiration 
from that of the European Court of Human Rights, and Article 52 paragraph 
3 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights requires that Charter rights cor-
responding to those contained in the European Convention ought to have the 
same scope and content as those rights. All this notwithstanding, the binding 
effect of EU fundamental rights as argued for in this contribution is not only 
a different dogmatic construction, but has also significant practical implica-
tions. In particular, the present approach requires a relevant interpretation 
reached by the CJEU to be respected simultaneously under the Bilateral 
Agreements, irrespectively of whether the European Court of Human Rights 
has already given a reply to the question at issue or not. Furthermore, the 
catalogue of rights of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is more com-
prehensive than the one of the European Convention on Human Rights; sev-
eral of the rights not contained in the European Convention on Human 
Rights could arguably be relevant under the Bilateral Agreements. 
At the same time, the suggested approach also illustrates the difficulty of 
assessing the exact scope of the EU legal acquis that has effectively been 
transferred through the Bilateral Agreements; not easily predictable aspects 
are encompassed under the obligations contained in the Bilateral Agree-
ments, despite the fact that the contracting parties may not have clearly con-
sidered them at the time of negotiation. 
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As regards the respect for human rights, the approach suggested in this 
contribution entails a further ‘internationalisation’ of human rights protec-
tion in Switzerland. The minimum standard granted to date only by the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights is enlarged in terms of substance, as 
far as the application of notions of EU law under the Bilateral Agreements is 
concerned. Moreover, the jurisprudence of a further international court – the 
CJEU – must be considered in Switzerland as regards the protection of hu-
man rights if the mentioned preconditions are fulfilled. Ultimately, an addi-
tional, dogmatically different mechanism of implementation becomes avai l-
able for the human rights granted under the European Convention on Human 
rights next to the European Court of Human Rights; the effectiveness of the 
protection of fundamental rights is likely to benefit both in general and as 
regards the rights granted under the European Convention on Human Rights. 
It thus becomes conceivable that the rights granted under the Agreement on 
the Free Movement of Persons are at least partly considered to be ‘funda-
mental rights’, which could – just like the rights granted directly by the Eu-
roepan Convention on Human Rights - even claim primacy over federal law 
where the Swiss legislator intentionally legislated contrary to international 
obligations such as those included in the Agreement on the Free Movement 
of Persons.
45
 This is of particular relevance for the current problems related 
with the initiative on expulsion (Ausschaffungsinitiative).
46
 
At the end of the day, the binding effect of EU fundamental rights as part 
of the application and interpretation of provisions of the Bilateral Agree-
ments entails a diversification of the system of protection for fundamental 
rights, which is certainly advantageous in terms of effectiveness. At the 
same time, the rising complexity of the system of fundamental rights protec-
tion must not be underestimated, which encompasses three levels, none of 
which are identical neither in terms of the content of fundamental rights nor 
in terms of their mechanisms of implementation. Fundamental rights protec-
tion thus operates at the level of the Swiss Constitution, the European Con-
vention on Human Rights and the Bilateral Agreements. 
 
  
                                                 
45
 In the Schubert case (BGE 99 Ib 39), the Supreme Court had accepted such legislation as 
having primacy over international law within the Swiss legal order, unless obligations un-
der the European Convention on Human Rights would be at stake. This latter exception 
would thus also apply here. 
46
 See on the topic Epiney (2011/2012), pp. 107 ff. 
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